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Pension	strike:	university	staff	are	getting	a	‘Die
Quickly’	pension	plan.	It	won’t	work.
What	is	at	stake	in	the	ongoing	university	strikes?	To	answer	this	question,	Ewan	McGaughey	explains
how	the	pension	system	works,	who	governs	it,	and	their	conflicts	of	interest.	He	argues	that	there	is	a
need	to	rebuild	the	university	and	pension	governance	system	so	that	it	is	more	democratic	and	just.
Otherwise	the	same	issues	will	keep	returning.
We	need	justice	in	education.	In	the	face	of	massive	strikes	and	student	protest,	Universities	UK
proposes	to	change	pensions	from	‘DB’	to	‘DC’	plans.	But	what	does	this	all	really	mean?	My	niche	field
of	pension	law	and	corporate	governance	has	suddenly	become	cool	with	the	university	strike,	so	I’d	like	to	(1)
explain	the	issues	in	this	strike	in	the	simplest	terms,	(2)	explain	who	governs	our	pensions	and	universities,	and
their	conflicts	of	interest,	and	(3)	what	we	can	do	about	it.	We	must	rebuild	our	university	and	pension	governance
system,	so	this	never	happens	again.
What	is	the	strike	about?
In	a	‘Defined	Benefit’	(DB)	scheme,	your	employer	guarantees	you	income	from	retirement	till	death,	based	on	your
contributions.	It	doesn’t	matter	how	long	you’ll	live.	This	is	mostly	what	the	university	pension,	USS,	is	now.	In	a
‘Defined	Contribution’	(DC)	scheme,	you	get	money	on	your	retirement.	But	if	you	live	longer	than	you	expect,	that
could	run	out.	If	you	live	fewer	years	than	you	expect,	your	family	could	inherit	what	is	left	over.	Universities	UK	has	a
new	plan	to	make	all	pensions	‘DC’.	We	should	call	these	what	they	are:	‘Die	Quickly’	(DQ)	pensions.	You’re	better
off	not	living	into	old	age,	when	money	runs	out.	DC	means	DQ.
The	university	employers,	UUK	(the	university	Vice	Chancellors),	argue	people	are	living	longer,	and	so	DB	pensions
are	unsustainable.	What	they	don’t	say	is	the	UK	has	among	the	worst	pension	systems	in	the	world	because	DB
schemes	have	been	shutdown.	Successful	pension	systems	have	public	DB	schemes,	where	the	state	pension
guarantees	you	an	income	for	life.
Source:	OECD,	Pensions	at	a	Glance	2017.
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Supported	by	valuations	of	USS	managers,	the	employers	argue	spiralling	payments	are	needed	to	maintain	pension
benefits	as	they	are.	What	they	don’t	say	is	they	reach	this	result	through	‘mark	to	market	accounting’,	which	faces
huge	criticism.	USS	puts	everyone’s	contributions	together	and	invests	in	the	stock	market,	corporate	bonds,
government	bonds,	derivatives,	and	funds	of	funds.	Those	asset	values	go	up	and	down	with	the	market.	‘Mark	to
market	accounting’	means	accounts	show	that	market	volatility.	An	alternative	is	‘smoothing’	of	values,	to	average
out	market	volatility.	This	could	be	better,	but	pension	funds	should	have	decade	long	investment	strategies,	not
think	in	short	3	year	terms.
What	USS	has	done	is	picked	a	point	(31	March	2017)	when	asset	prices	happened	to	be	low	as	proof	there	is	a
massive	pension	deficit.	UUK	now	says	“defined	benefit	pensions	are	unsustainable!”	What	they	don’t	say	is	that
employers	took	pension	‘holidays’	(not	paying	into	your	pension)	when	asset	prices	were	high	between	1997	and
2009.	One	reason	asset	prices	have	tanked	in	the	short-term	is	the	economy	is	being	destroyed	with,	and	since,	the
Brexit	poll.
Who	governs	our	pensions?
It	gets	worse.	The	board	of	USS	is	packed	with	‘co-opted’	directors	(5	of	them)	who	hold	the	balance	of	power
between	employer	representatives	(4)	and	staff	or	union	representatives	(3).	Currently,	the	co-opted	USS	directors
are	four	previous	asset	managers,	and	one	mining	manager:	from	JP	Morgan,	Warburg	Pincus,	Old	Mutual,
Schroders,	and	Rio	Tinto.	Asset	managers	in	the	US	and	UK	have	for	30	years	pushed	for	all	DB	pensions	to	close,
to	become	DC/DQ	schemes.	For	instance,	Arnold	Schwarzenegger	tried	to	‘terminate’	the	California	teachers
retirement	scheme	in	2005,	but	he	lost	after	mass	opposition.	Asset	managers	and	certain	politicians	want	this
because	they	can	make	more	fees.	If	you	retire,	and	you	have	a	lump	of	cash,	but	you	don’t	know	how	long	you	will
live,	the	asset	managers	can	help	you	(for	a	fee).	They	can	sell	you	an	annuity,	to	give	you	income	as	long	as	you
live	(for	a	fee).
Asset	manager	fees	are	uncontrolled.	If	you	have	an	average	pension	for	40	years,	a	1.5%	yearly	asset
management	fee	sucks	35%	of	your	pension	savings	into	the	pockets	of	the	City.	Even	a	0.5%	fee	destroys	13%	of
your	pension.	If	we	get	DC/DQ	pensions,	we	will	be	sold	these	annuity	‘services’	just	like	the	mafia	sells	protection.	If
you	don’t	buy	an	annuity,	you’d	better	Die	Quickly.	But	if	you	do	buy	an	annuity,	you	will	be	poor,	and	beholden	to
City	asset	managers.	Unlike	a	well-managed	USS,	those	asset	managers	selling	you	annuities	really	might	go
bankrupt,	leaving	nothing:	like	Equitable	Life	or	Barlow	Clowes	did.
This	is	why	it	matters	that	asset	managers	are	packed	onto	the	USS	board.	However	friendly	and	outgoing	they	are
as	individuals,	they	are	a	lobby	group	for	destroying	DB	pensions.	But	it	gets	worse	still.	If	you	read	into	the	USS
annual	reports	(I	encourage,	but	don’t	recommend	it!)	you	find	that	USS	is	now	paying	its	fund	managers	as	a	whole
482%	in	2017	(p.15)	of	their	bill	in	2008	(p.103).	Total	USS	operating	costs	are	186%	today	of	the	price	10	years
ago.
So	why	haven’t	the	university	Vice-Chancellors	done	anything	about	it?	If	university	employers	are	on	the	hook,	why
haven’t	they	reformed	USS?	The	answer	is	they	do	not	have	any	incentive	to	care.	As	Adam	Smith	said	in	The
Wealth	of	Nations,	they	control	‘other	people’s	money…	Negligence	and	profusion,	therefore,	must	always	prevail’.
Always,	unless	there	is	accountability	in	university	governance.
University	Vice-Chancellors	are	often	friendly,	politician-type	figures,	but	the	systems	to	hold	them	accountable	are
seriously	defective.	For	example,	Dame	Glynis	Breakwell	was	the	Vice	Chancellor	of	Bath	until	forced	to	announce
resignation	in	November	2017.	She	was	paid	£468,000	a	year.	And	guess	what?	UUK	put	her	on	the	USS	board.
Even	if	Vice	Chancellors	don’t	directly	set	their	own	pay,	people	they	can	appoint,	influence,	or	work	with,	do.	Staff
and	students	get	votes	for	the	governing	body	in	many	universities.	But	these	systems	lack	transparency,	and	need
to	improve	a	lot.
What	we	can	do:	students	and	staff
British Politics and Policy at LSE: Pension strike: university staff are getting a ‘Die Quickly’ pension plan. It won’t work. Page 2 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-03-06
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/pension-strike-explainer/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/
So	we	need	three	big	changes.	First,	in	every	university,	staff,	the	University	and	College	Union,	and	students	should
demand	every	governing	body	has	a	majority	elected	by	staff	and	students.	Many	universities	do	this,	but	the
systems	need	to	be	transparent	and	universal.	To	give	just	two	examples,	at	Cambridge	University	the	25	person
Council	has	16	staff	seats,	3	student	seats,	and	6	seats	for	university	managers.	But	although	the	Council	is	bound
by	fellows’	votes,	staff	seats	are	weighted	by	seniority,	and	many	part-time,	fixed-term,	and	administrative	staff	are
excluded	from	voting.	At	King’s	College,	London	the	Charter	and	Statutes	requires	a	21	member	Council,	with	12	lay
members,	8	staff,	1	student.	But	there	is	no	provision	for	actual	elections	of	staff	representatives,	and	they	should	not
be	in	a	minority.	When	managers	are	unaccountable	there	is	negligence	and	profusion.	UCU	stopped	the	abolition	of
staff	representation	in	2011.	It	is	likely	that	UCU	members	will	organise	and	push	forward.
Second,	we	need	to	make	pension	governance	accountable.	USS	is	a	big,	multi-employer	pension	plan.	It	should
eliminate	inflated	costs,	and	take	asset	management	and	corporate	voting	completely	in-house.	Nobody	on	its	board
should	have	possible	conflicts	of	interest	from	their	professional	background:	that	includes	asset	managers	like	JP
Morgan,	and	mining	corporations	like	Rio	Tinto.	The	most	successful	pension	fund	is	the	Church	of	England	scheme,
which	has	done	what	the	asset	management	industry	said	was	impossible:	it	made	money	with	ethical	investment,
and	is	divesting	from	fossil	fuels.	UCU	should	get	a	majority	of	staff	representatives	on	the	pension	board,	and
conduct	direct	elections	for	USS	members.	This	will	strengthen	USS	and	UCU	by	engaging	staff	in	union	and
pension	policy.	When	people	have	a	stake	and	a	voice,	they	will	not	let	go.	They	are	the	experts.	They	will	not	let
anything	like	this	happen	again.
Third,	education	must	be	accessible	based	on	merit,	and	that	means	free,	funded	by	progressive	tax,	not	regressive
debt.	In	this	strike,	students	are	not	fooled	by	attempts	to	divide	them	from	staff.	They	know	the	same	management
that	is	cutting	pensions	supported	rising	tuition	fees.	Sir	Andrew	Cubie	chaired	the	‘Joint	Negotiating	Committee’
behind	USS,	and	used	his	casting	vote	to	order	that	DB	pensions	are	scrapped.	In	2000	Sir	Andrew	wrote	a	report
favouring	tuition	fees	in	Scotland	(but	paid	through	a	graduate	tax),	and	has	recently	been	advocating	austerity.
Younger	academics,	like	me,	were	the	original	targets	for	this	experiment	in	higher	fees,	not	higher	education.	We
are	the	same	as	students.	We	oppose	kleptocratic,	conflicted,	incompetent	administration.	We	want	democracy	and
justice	in	education.
______
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